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Abstract
This paper studies how cartel stability is inuenced by asymmetric
information and communication about demand. Firms in a cartel face
uctuating demand in a repeated game framework. In each period, one
randomly chosen rm knows current demand. In this context we consider
two di¤erent equilibria  one where the informed rm communicates its
information to its partners and another where it does not. We show
that cartels are extremely unstable when the informed rm communicates
with the uninformed rms. However, when the informed rm does not
communicate with the uninformed rms cartels can be as stable as when
there are no demand uctuations at all.
We would like to acknowledge the useful insights provided by Francis Bush.
yCorresponding author.
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In fact, this least controversial area of antitrust may well be the one
for which economists have the least satisfactory theoretical mod-
els of how illegal activity  talking about prices (and reaching an
agreement) matters.  Michael D. Whinston
1 Introduction
In markets not subject to random shocks, collusion turns out to be very easy
for cartels to maintain. It therefore seems that random shocks, such as demand
uctuations, are necessary to model realistic levels of cartel instability (Rotem-
berg and Saloner, 1986). However, if information is symmetric, cartels still turn
out to be stable, unless such uctuations are very large. Thus, some additional
challenges to coordination, such as asymmetric information, may be necessary
to model plausible levels of cartel instability.
It is natural to suppose that coordination in the face of such asymmetric
information would be facilitated by communication. But is it? In this paper we
explore the role of communication in facilitating collusion when there is asym-
metric information about demand. We model an innitely repeated Cournot
game with n rms and asymmetric information about market conditions. De-
mand uctuates randomly from period to period. In each period one rm,
chosen randomly, knows more about the state of demand than the others. The
rms must then decide whether or not they should communicate to coordinate
production decisions.
We rst consider an equilibrium where the informed rm communicates with
the uninformed rms through a trade association, say (Vives 1990).1 The ob-
jective of this communication is to let uninformed rms know the current state
of demand, so the rms can divide up the market evenly each period. In this
situation we show that asymmetric information signicantly amplies the e¤ect
1This is consistent with Hay and Kelley (1974) and Fraas and Greer (1977), who nd that
collusion is often facilitated by information exchange, through a trade association, or some
other channel (see e.g. Hay and Kelley p. 21).
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of demand uctuations in increasing cartel instability since, in high-demand
states, the informed rm can lie as well as cheat.
Next we consider an equilibrium where the informed rm does not com-
municate with the other rms. In this case, since the informed rm can no
longer lie to the uninformed rms, cartels become more stable. In fact, cartels
turn out to be not only as stable as when there is no asymmetric information,
they actually become as stable as when there are no demand uctuations at
all. Thus, we show that information asymmetry may increase cartel instability
if rms communicate, but may actually cancel out the e¤ects of demand uc-
tuations themselves if rms do not communicate. Intuitively, when there is no
communication then, when the informed rm is most tempted to cheat  when
demand is high  its output is high enough to cancel out this higher temptation
to cheat.
Note, however, that in this paper communication is not actually necessary for
the cartel to achieve e¢ciency, since the informed rm can adjust its own output
to maximize cartel prots. It would therefore be interesting to consider other
environments where communication is more important. For example, if more
than one rm is informed, communication may be necessary to allow informed
rms to coordinate with each other to maximize cartel prots. The results of
this paper then suggest that such information structures may make cartels more
unstable.
This paper contributes to a small but growing literature on the challenges
faced by cartels which use communication to help them coordinate a collusive
agreement in the face of asymmetric information. Major previous results in
this literature include folk theorems in general repeated games with communi-
cation (Compte, 1998, Kandori and Matsushima, 1998; see also the symposium
on repeated games with asymmetric information in the January 2002 issue of
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the Journal of Econometric Theory). However, folk theorems focus on agents
whose discount factors approach one. They therefore do not allow us to study
the e¤ect of asymmetric information on collusion between rms which are very
patient, but whose discount factors are bounded away from one. Folk theorems
are therefore an important, but blunt, instrument for measuring the e¤ects of
asymmetric information on cartel instability.
Papers focusing on repeated game collusion between asymmetrically in-
formed rms include Aoyagi (2002), Athey and Bagwell (2001), and Athey,
Bagwell, and Sanchirico (2004). Aoyagi (2002) considers a Bertrand-like model,
where rms observe private demand signals after choosing their own prices.
Thus, communication is not used to adjust production to uctuations in de-
mand, but only to help distinguish random demand uctuations from shifts
due to cheating by collusive partners. In Athey and Bagwell (2001), commu-
nication helps cartel members coordinate their responses to cost uctuations
observed before choosing prices, so production can be allocated to low cost
rms. Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico (2004) also focus on cost uctuations,
though they briey consider publicly observed demand uctuations as well. In
addition, this later paper does not allow communication.
Thus, none of these papers consider the problem of coordinating collusive
agreements in the face of asymmetric information about demand uctuations.
They also do not consider the possibility that the act of communication itself
may be crucial to cartel stability.
Moreover, the above papers focus primarily on the problem of hard-to-detect
on schedule deviations, in which one type of player simply pretends to be a
di¤erent type of player. Thus, a players private information never becomes
public in these models. While this assumption is plausible for the cost shocks
considered by Athey and Bagwell (2001) and Athey Bagwell and Sanchirico
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(2004), they may be less plausible for demand shocks. In fact, the demand
shocks considered by Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico (2004) are fully public.
This paper, by contrast, focuses on coordination in the face of demand uc-
tuations where information is initially private but eventually becomes public.
This allows us to focus on the implications of asymmetric information in a con-
text where the only deviations cartel members must worry about are easier to
detect o¤ schedule deviations. Thus we can avoid the signicant technical dif-
culties involved in the imperfect private monitoring literature. In particular,
this simplication allows us to measure the quantitative e¤ect of asymmetric
information and communication on cartel instability among rms with discount
factors bounded away from one.
Note also that the information sharing in this paper is di¤erent from that in,
e.g., Vives (1984) and related papers. In that literature, information is veriable,
whereas we are assuming that information in our model is not veriable until
the next period.2 Thus, the only reason why an informed rm would tell the
truth in our model is the hope of future cooperation. On the other hand, the
possibility of lying enhances the incentive to cheat. Of course, in the equilibrium
where rms do not communicate, the issue of veriability is irrelevant.
There is an ongoing debate about the empirical plausibility of the Rotemberg-
Saloner framework, which is the starting point of our analysis.3 Some of this
debate concerns the behavior of cartels over the business cycle. However, this
debate ignores the role of asymmetric information or communication in cartel
stability, choosing instead to focus entirely on correlations between prices and
business cycles. Since the focus of our paper is on asymmetric information
2As suggested by Vives (1990, p. 414), this other literature must assume veriability since
otherwise informed rms will always give in to the temptation to lie. In our model, rms
trade o¤ the temptation to lie against the gains from being trusted in the future.
3This literature includes Porter (1983), Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), Domowitz, Hub-
bard and Petersen (1986), Hajivassiliou (1989), Town (1991), Rotemberg and Woodford
(1992), Ellison (1994), Borenstein and Shepard (1996), Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996), and
Suslow (1998) among others.
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about demand uctuations, and since rms are likely to be equally informed
about the macroeconomy, we are primarily concerned with individual market
uctuations uncorrelated with business cycles. Thus, the above debate regard-
ing the Rotemberg and Saloner framework may not be particularly relevant for
our paper.
Section 2 describes the basic game. It also examines the collusive trig-
ger strategy equilibrium when the informed rm communicates with the unin-
formed rms, including the critical interest rate above which collusion breaks
down. Section 3 shows that, when rms communicate, asymmetric informa-
tion generally explains much more cartel instability than demand uctuations
alone. Numerical simulations also show that this e¤ect can be quite dramatic.
Section 4 looks at the game described in Section 2, but modies the trigger
strategy by assuming that rms no longer communicate. We show that if rms
do not communicate then cartels become as stable as when there are no demand
uctuations at all. Section 5 concludes.
Before proceeding, we should emphasize that, to facilitate computation we
make very specic assumptions about functional forms  specically linear de-
mand and total cost curves, and a two point distribution of the demand shock.
This is consistent with our goal of computing ball-park estimates of the quanti-
tative e¤ects of asymmetric information and communication. However, it should
be noted that our most striking result  that in the absence of communication
cartels are as stable as if there are no demand uctuations at all  will not
hold exactly in more general settings. It should, however, still be approximately
true. Future work should investigate how sensitive this result is to the exact
functional forms we consider. Indeed, it would be very interesting if, for some
functional forms, asymmetric information, without communication, turned out
to make cartels more stable than the no-uctuations case!
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2 Payo¤s and Credible Trigger Strategies When
Information is Shared
Consider an innitely repeated n-rm Cournot oligopoly, where market demand
is either high or low, with demand uctuating independently across periods. Let
the inverse market demand function be
p(Q) = a Q
where a is a random variable. In the high-demand state the intercept term is
aH and in the low-demand state the intercept term is aL, with aH > aL. The
demand curves are linear for simplicity. All rms know that the probability of
high demand is  and the probability of low demand is 1   . In each period
one rm is informed about a and n 1 rms are uninformed. However, all rms
know the parameter values aH and aL, though uninformed rms do not know
the current state of demand. The identity of the informed rm uctuates inde-
pendently from period to period, with each rm equally likely to be chosen as
that periods informed rm. The informed rm is told current demand but not
future demand. The other n 1 rms know the identity of the current informed
rm, but do not know current or future demand.4 As part of a collusive agree-
ment, the rm that happens to be informed in a period may convey information
about the state of demand to the other rms. However, the informed rm may
also lie to the other rms. Nevertheless, all rms learn previous demand, so any
lying by the informed rm can be detected with a one period lag.
4This information structure is chosen to allow for the possibility that di¤erent rms are
informed in di¤erent periods. Thus there is no "leading" rm that is always informed. Having
said that, the fundamental results of this paper do not change if there is a leading rm that
is always informed.
However, note that the information structure is restrictive in other ways. For example,
to the extent that demand uctuations follow the business cycle, information about these
uctuations may tend to be more symmetric. It would be interesting to see if any new
insights could be gained from considering more complicated information structures.
7
Next, to reduce notation, assume that production of the good is costless.
With constant marginal cost c, we could replace aH with aH   c and aL with
aL  c in the equations below. Finally, assume that all rms discount using the
discount factor 1=(1 + r), where r is the interest rate.
Consider a collusive agreement in which the informed rm in each period
informs the other rms about the state of demand  through a trade associa-
tion, say. Specically consider the following strategy prole. In each period the
informed rm truthfully reveals the state of demand to the other rms. The
rms then divide the monopoly output equally among themselves. If any rm
deviates in any period, all rms revert to the non-cooperative one-shot equilib-
rium for all periods thereafter. The question is then, for what values of r is
the strategy prole an equilibrium. The cartel is then unstable if the strategy
prole is only an equilibrium if rms are very patient, i.e. if r is low.
Section 2.1 below determines the expected per-period payo¤ to each of the
rms if they collude. The expected payo¤s during the non-cooperative punish-
ment phase are derived in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 derives the one-period payo¤
to the informed rm given that it lies and cheats on the collusive agreement
at the expense of the others when demand is high. Section 2.4 derives the dis-
counted expected payo¤ to each rm over time and the critical interest rate
above which full collusion is not possible.
2.1 Expected Payo¤s Per Period if the Firms Collude
If the rms collude, the informed rm in each period tells the uninformed rms
the state of demand and together they divide the monopoly output and prots
equally among themselves. Thus, each rm produces aH=2n in the high demand
state and aL=2n in the low demand state, so the payo¤ to each rm is a
2
H=4n in
the high demand state and a2L=4n in the low demand state. Expected per-period
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payo¤ to any rm if the collusive agreement holds is therefore
COLL = 
a2H
4n
+ (1  )
a2L
4n
(1)
where the superscript COLL stands for collusive.
2.2 Strategies and Expected Per Period Payo¤s in the
Punishment Phase
If any rm deviates from the collusive agreement the industry reverts to a per-
manent non-cooperative phase.5 In the punishment phase the rms do not com-
municate since the uninformed rms no longer trust the informed rms. Thus,
uninformed rms do not know demand in a particular period, though they do
know the probability of high or low demand in any period. This yields a Bayes-
Nash equilibrium in each period. In this equilibrium the quantity produced by
each uninformed rm is given by
qNC;U =
(aH   aL) + aL
n+ 1
(2)
where the superscript NC stands for noncooperative, and U stands for un-
informed. This output is independent of whether demand is high or low, since
uninformed rms do not know the state of demand.
When demand is high the informed rm produces
5Note that we do not use optimal punishment strategies of the sort discussed in Abreu
(1986) or Abreu, Pierce, and Stachetti (1986). It would be interesting to extend the analysis of
optimal punishment strategies to environments such as this one, with asymmetric information
about game payo¤ functions. However, this would add considerable complexity to our analysis.
Also, it would probably not change the qualitative results much. When rms communicate,
our results are driven by the increased temptation to cheat in situations where the cheater
can also lie about the state of the world, and this e¤ect would remain. When rms do not
communicate, our results are driven by the fact that under collusion, the informed rm meets
all of the additional demand in high-demand states. In this case too, it should not matter
much whether punishment is optimal or not. Note that Athey and Bagwell (2001) assume
Nash reversion punishments in their numerical examples. Aoyagi (2002) also assumes Nash
reversion punishment strategies.
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qNC;IH =
(n+ 1)aH   (n  1)((aH   aL) + aL)
2(n+ 1)
(3)
where the superscript I stands for informed. Finally, when demand is low the
informed rm produces
qNC;IL =
(n+ 1)aL   (n  1)((aH   aL) + aL)
2(n+ 1)
: (4)
Using pH = aH (n 1)q
NC;U qNC;IH and pL = aL (n 1)q
NC;U qNC;IL shows
that the market price in the punishment phase with high demand is pH = q
NC;I
H ,
and with low demand, pL = q
NC;I
L . The expected payo¤ to an uninformed rm
in a given period of the punishment phase is therefore given by
NC;U = qNC;UqNC;IH + (1  )q
NC;UqNC;IL (5)
and the expected prot to a rm if it is informed is given by
NC;I = (qNC;IH )
2 + (1  )(qNC;IL )
2: (6)
Now, in any period, there is a 1=n chance of a rm being informed and an
(n 1)=n chance of it being uninformed. Therefore, the ex ante expected payo¤
to the rm in the punishment phase, before it knows whether it is informed, is
given by
NC =
1
n
NC;I +
n  1
n
NC;U : (7)
2.3 A Lying Cheating Informed Firm
In each period that the collusive agreement is supposed to be in place (including
the one in which cheating occurs), the informed rm makes a statement to the
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uninformed rms about the state of the market. The informed rm may tell
the truth or lie, but the uninformed rms believe the informed rm unless the
agreement has been broken previously.
With low demand, the informed rm has less incentive to lie, and so less
incentive to cheat. We therefore focus on the high demand situation. If demand
is high, but the informed rm cheats, it will also tell the other rms that demand
is low. Thus, the uninformed rms produce their share of the low demand
monopoly output. This is aL=2n per rm, or (n  1)aL=2n in the aggregate.
The informed rms problem is to maximize prots given this output of the
uninformed rms. Thus, the cheating informed rm produces
qCH;IH =
2naH   (n  1)aL
4n
(8)
where CH stands for cheating. The payo¤ to the cheating informed rm is
then given by
CH;IH =

2naH   (n  1)aL
4n
2
: (9)
Of course, the uninformed rms can cheat too. However, since they cannot
lie or take advantage of high demand, their temptation to cheat is lower than
the informed rms. Thus they do not a¤ect the critical point at which collusion
becomes unstable.
2.4 The Decision to Cooperate and the Critical Interest
Rate.
We have modeled a situation where the informed rm might lie and cheat on
a collusive agreement. In the equilibrium we are considering, if a rm cheats
in one period, then, starting in the next period, all rms forever enter a non-
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cooperative phase. In this subsection we nd the maximum (critical) interest
rate consistent with a credible trigger strategy that maintains full collusion. In
other words we calculate the rate of return on investment in collusion for an
informed rm in a high demand state.
Let r be the interest rate rms use to calculate the present value of future
prots. Thus r measures the patience of a rm in terms of its willingness to
wait for future prots. The higher the rate of interest, the less important is
the future expected stream of collusive prots and thus the greater the relative
allure of cheating today.
The expected payo¤ to each rm if collusion is maintained in this and all
future periods, given that current demand is high, is
a2H
4n
+
1
r
COLL (10)
where COLL is dened in (1). Expected present and future payo¤ to a lying,
cheating, informed rm, given that current demand is high, is
CH;IH +
1
r
NC (11)
where CH;IH and 
NC are dened in (9) and (7) respectively. Thus, the informed
rm is willing to supply truthful information and cooperate if and only if
a2H
4n
+
1
r
COLL  CH;IH +
1
r
NC : (12)
This inequality reects the fact that, for a trigger strategy to be credible, the
expected present discounted payo¤ from colluding must be greater than or equal
to that from cheating. It follows that full collusion is possible through this
equilibrium if and only if
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r  rasym =
COLL   NC
CH;IH  
a2
H
4n
(13)
where COLL, NC , and CH;IH are dened in (1), (7), and (9), respectively.
Proposition 1 yields a formula for the critical interest rate, rasym. The formal
proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 The maximum interest rate consistent with the above trigger
strategy, with asymmetric information and communication is
rasym =
4n(n  1)((aH   aL) + aL)
2
(n+ 1)2(n(2aH   aL)2   a2L)
: (14)
This is the maximum value of r that will allow our trigger strategy to be
credible. In other words, rasym is the rate of return on full cooperation for
the situation when cheating is most protable (i.e., when the cheating rm
is informed and demand is high). Any higher value of r will make cheating
relatively more attractive by discounting the expected future prots from col-
lusion too much. This would weaken the threat of a trigger strategy. Thus, if
r > rasym, the rms cannot maintain the symmetric, joint-prot maximizing
level of collusion. Note that setting aH = aL in Proposition 1 simplies (14) to
rasym = r

0 = 4n=(n+1)
2. This, as expected, is the interest rate consistent with
a credible trigger strategy if there are no demand uctuations and consequently
no information asymmetry.
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3 The Quantitative E¤ects of Information Asym-
metry on Cartel Stability Under Communica-
tion.
In our model there are two factors that lead to greater cartel instability. The
rst factor is randomly uctuating demand (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986), and
the second is the temptation to lie to take advantage of asymmetric informa-
tion. Together, these factors reduce the return to cooperation much more than
do demand uctuations alone, as shown in Proposition 2 and Table 1 below.
Proposition 2 focuses on the limiting case of small uctuations. The numerical
simulations in Table 1 then illustrate the result in Proposition 2. The proof of
Proposition 2 is in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 As aH approaches aL, the fraction of the fall in r

asym attribut-
able to asymmetric information approaches the proportion
lim
aH!aL
rsym   r

asym
r0   r

asym
=
n+ 1
2n  (n  1)
(15)
where r0 is the critical interest rate in the absence of demand uctuations,
rsym is the critical interest rate with symmetric (full) information about current
demand, and rasym is the critical interest rate when the information structure
is asymmetric.
The denominator, r0   r

asym, in Proposition 2 measures the total fall in the
critical interest rate due to demand uctuations and asymmetric information.
The numerator, rsym  r

asym, measures the fall in this critical interest rate due
to asymmetric information alone. The ratio thus gives the proportion of the
total fall in this critical rate due to asymmetric information.
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Table 1 shows this limiting proportion for a wide range of parameter
values. First, for most values of  and n, information asymmetry explains much
more cartel instability than demand uctuations alone. For example, for two
rms and a 50-50 chance of high versus low demand, asymmetric information
explains over 85% of the total reduction in cartel stability, with demand uctu-
ations alone explaining less than 15%. Thus, while uncertainty alone might not
explain much cartel instability, uncertainty plus asymmetric information may
go a long way towards explaining why cartels are not uniformly successful.
 n = 2 n = 5 n = 10
0.1 76.92% 62.5% 57.59%
0.2 78.95% 65.22% 60.44%
0.5 85.71% 75% 70.97%
0.8 93.75% 88.24% 85.94%
1 100% 100% 100%
Table 1: Limiting Proportion of the Fall in the Critical Interest Rate Due to
Asymmetric Information
Notice that as  rises, the proportion of the fall in the critical interest rate
due to asymmetric information rises. In fact, according to Proposition 2, for
  1, asymmetric information is almost the only reason rasym falls.
We noted earlier that there were two reasons why greater demand uctu-
ations lead to a fall in the critical interest rate rasym. First, the benet from
cheating in high demand states today rises compared to the expected benets
of future cooperation, even when there is no informational asymmetry. This is
the point made by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). Second, with asymmetric
information, the informed rm is tempted, in the high demand state, to lie to
the uninformed rms, and tell them that demand is low. Now, as  rises, the
high demand state becomes more likely in the future, so the expected reward
to future cooperation rises relative to cheating prots. This reduces the rst
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reason to cheat. Thus, as  rises, less of the fall in rasym is attributable to the
rst, Rotemberg and Saloner, reason for cheating. This leaves only the second
reason, i.e. the informed rms ability to lie under asymmetric information.
Ultimately, if high demand is almost certain, then the only reason why rasym
falls below r0 is because the informed rm can lie. Thus lying can be a power-
ful source of cartel instability when informed rms are expected to share their
information. In other words, asymmetric information about demand may help
a lot in explaining cartel instability.
However, asymmetric information loses some of its power to explain cartel
instability as the number of rms in the cartel rise. Nevertheless, even when
n is very large, asymmetric information always explains at least the fraction
1=(2   ) of the fall in r, according to the approximation in Proposition 2.
Note that this fraction exceeds one half for all  > 0. Thus, even in extreme
cases, asymmetric information explains at least half of the fall in rasym in the
limit. In other words, asymmetric information always contributes signicantly
to the e¤ect of demand uctuations on cartel instability.
We next illustrate this e¤ect for the general case where aH does not approach
aL: Recall from Section 2 that the a parameters can be interpreted as aH   c
and aL   c, for the case in which marginal cost is a non-zero constant c. A
useful measure of demand uctuations is then (aH   c)=(aL   c), which we call
the uctuation ratio. To get a sense of what this uctuation ratio means,
note that, for a demand intercept a, and marginal cost c, the markup of price
over marginal cost is (a   c)=2. Thus, when the uctuation ratio is 2.00, this
means that, if we move from the low-demand state to the high-demand state,
the monopoly markup over marginal cost doubles. Tables 2 and 3 below treat
the cases of symmetric and asymmetric information, respectively, and report
the critical interest rate for various values of the uctuation ratio, and various
16
values for the total number of rms, n. We assume in these tables that the
probability, , of the high demand state is  = 0:50.6
aH c
aL c
n = 2 n = 5 n = 10
1 88.9% 55.6% 33%
1.2 75.3% 47.1% 28%
1.4 67.1% 41.9% 25%
1.6 61.8% 38.6% 23%
1.8 58.2% 36.3% 21.6%
2 35.6% 34.7% 20.7%
Table 2: Critical Interest Rate (Symmetric Information)
aH c
aL c
n = 2 n = 5 n = 10
1 88.9% 55.6% 33%
1.2 36.8% 30.6% 19.6%
1.4 23.4% 21% 13.6%
1.6 17.3% 16.2% 10%*
1.8 13.9% 13.3% 8.9%*
2 11.8% 11.4% 7.7%*
Table 3: Critical Interest Rate (Asymmetric Information)
To interpret these tables, note that, whether the interest rate is annual or
semiannual, say, depends on the production period and/or seasonal demand
patterns. Thus, for industries where demand has a steep seasonal pattern, due
to high Christmas sales, for example, then we can interpret our periods as years.
For other industries, a period might be six months or three months or whatever.
In these cases a given r from the table might represent an annual interest rate
6There is one problem here. If the number of rms and the uctuation ratios are both
large, then the non-cooperative punishment strategy derived in Section 2.2 above requires
the informed rm to produce a negative quantity when demand is low. When this happens,
we solve the model again subject to the constraint that the informed rm cannot produce
negative amounts. The calculations are omitted, since they add no new insights, though they
are available upon request. The critical interest rates marked with an asterisk have been
calculated with this constraint binding.
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which is roughly two times larger (for six month periods) or four times larger
(for three month periods) and so on.
Now, the rst rows of Tables 2 and 3 show that, in the absence of demand
uctuations (aH = aL), even relatively large cartels are extremely stable. Even
with 10 rms in the industry, for example, full collusion is possible with an
interest rate of 33%. Thus, the question ceases to be how are cartels possible
and becomes, why arent more industries cartelized?
The other rows of Table 2 provide a possible partial explanation for cartel
instability. Fluctuations in demand put pressure on collusive agreements even
when information is symmetric. That is, demand uctuations lower the critical
interest rate, and so, make collusion somewhat more di¢cult. For a two-rm
cartel, a uctuation ratio of 2 yields a critical interest rate of about 35.6%, a drop
of 53.3 percentage points from the critical interest rate of 88.9% corresponding
to no uctuations. When there are ten rms in the industry, the critical rate falls
less dramatically, from 33.0% to 20.7%, or 12.3 percentage points. Thus, even
with large uctuations in demand, relatively large cartels remain surprisingly
stable. Demand uctuations by themselves are therefore incapable of explaining
plausible levels of cartel instability.
Introducing asymmetric information, however, as in Table 3, dramatically
increases cartel instability, as we would expect from Proposition 2 and Table 1.
Thus, with a uctuation ratio of 2 and symmetric information, a ve-rm cartel
can maintain a collusive agreement with an interest rate of 35%. However, if
we add asymmetric information, with the same uctuation ratio, the maximum
interest rate consistent with full collusion falls to 11.4%. This underscores the
potential of asymmetric information to explain cartel instability. Once we move
to asymmetric information, demand uctuations have the potential to dramat-
ically increase cartel instability. This happens because the temptation to cheat
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is greatest when demand is high, and in this situation, the cheating rm can
also lie to mislead the other rms into thinking that demand is low.
Of course, these calculations assume very specic forms for the demand
curves, costs, and information structure. In addition, it would be interesting
to compare these uctuation ratios to demand uctuations in various actual
markets. Finally, the demand uctuations here must be understood as those
which the uninformed rms cannot predict. The unpredictable components
of demand uctuations will generally be smaller than the total uctuations
in demand. Nevertheless, even with smaller uctuation ratios of 1.4 and 1.6,
asymmetric information has a signicant potential to explain why successful
cartels are not a universal phenomenon, as is clear from Tables 2 and 3.
Communication, however, plays a critical role in these results. So the obvious
next question is, do the same results hold when rms do not communicate? That
is, are cartels more or less stable when rms do not communicate? To answer
this question we next focus on an equilibrium with no communication.
4 Cartel StabilityWhen the Informed FirmDoes
Not Communicate
Recall that in our game a cartel faces demand uctuations and exactly one
randomly chosen member of the cartel actually knows the state of demand. In
Sections 2 and 3 we focused on an equilibrium trigger strategy where the in-
formed rm communicates the current state of demand to the uninformed rms.
We found that cartels become less stable for two reasons. First, when demand
is high, the informed rm knows that the benet from cheating today is large
compared to the expected rewards of future cooperation. Second, asymmetric
information gives the informed rm an incentive to lie. Thus, communication
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may actually intensify the destabilizing e¤ect of demand uctuations because it
gives the informed rm an opportunity to lie. The question then becomes what
happens if rms do not communicate? In this section we focus on an equilibrium
trigger strategy where rms do not communicate.
Recall that in our game one rm knows the state of demand in any given
period while the other rms do not. Moreover, the identity of the informed
rm changes independently from period to period, with each rm being equally
likely to be chosen as that periods informed rm. This section considers an
equilibrium where the informed rm does not communicate. Thus the key dif-
ference between the current equilibrium and the equilibrium derived in Section
2 is the lack of communication between rms. While colluding, an uninformed
rm produces a quantity (qU ) that depends only on expected demand, while the
informed rm produces a level of output based on actual demand. Note that,
since informed rms do not communicate, they cannot lie. This removes one
source of cartel instability.
Moreover, when demand is high, the informed rm gets to increase its own
output a great deal in response to the increase in demand, even if it does not
cheat, since the uninformed rms do not increase their output in response to
the high demand. This further reduces its incentive to cheat. In fact this means
that demand uctuations no longer cause any cartel instability. It therefore
turns out that, when rms do not communicate, cartels are not only as stable
as when there is no asymmetric information, but they are as stable as if there
are no demand uctuations at all.
In the sections below we derive the critical interest rate, rIH(q
U ) below, at
which an informed rm is willing to fully collude in the high-demand state. Note
that this critical interest rate depends on the quantity, qU , that the typical
uninformed rm is supposed to produce in equilibrium. We also derive the
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critical interest rate rIL(q
U ) for the informed rm in the low-demand state, and
the critical interest rate rU (qU ) for the typical uninformed rm. We then show
that all three functions, rIH(q
U ), rIL(q
U ), and rU (qU ), actually cross at the
critical interest rate r0 from the no uctuation case. This allows us to prove
our key result, Proposition 3 below.
Section 4.1 below determines the current and expected future collusive pay-
o¤s to both types of rm. Section 4.2 determines the cheating payo¤ to the
informed rm, both when current demand is high and when it is low. We also
derive the cheating prots for an uninformed rm in this section. Section 4.3
reiterates the punishment payo¤s to the informed and uninformed rms from
Section 2 above. In Section 4.4 we derive the discounted expected payo¤s from
cheating and colluding for the informed and uninformed rms. We then use
these payo¤s to obtain the critical interest rate, as a function of qU ; at which
each type of rm, in each possible situation, is willing to follow the trigger
strategy. This derivation leads us to Proposition 3, which proves that, without
communication, cartels are as stable as when there are no demand uctuations
at all. Unless otherwise stated, all notation here follows the conventions intro-
duced earlier. However, to distinguish this equilibrium from the equilibrium
in Section 2, we also include a subscript NT (no talking or communication)
wherever relevant.
4.1 Expected Per Period Payo¤s When Firms Collude
If the rms collude then the informed rm makes a production decision based
on its knowledge of the state of demand, while each uninformed rm produces
qU . Thus, when current demand is high the informed rm maximizes industry
prots by producing aH=2  (n  1)q
U . The market price in this case is aH=2.
Thus, the payo¤ to the informed rm given high demand is
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COLL;IH;NT =
aH
2
  (n  1)qU
 aH
2
: (16)
Similarly, in the low demand case the informed rm produces aL=2   (n  
1)qU and the market price is aL=2. Thus the payo¤ to the informed rm from
colluding when demand is low is
COLL;IL;NT =
aL
2
  (n  1)qU
 aL
2
: (17)
Equations (16) and (17) imply that the expected per period payo¤ to the
informed rm from colluding is
COLL;INT = 
COLL;I
H;NT + (1  )
COLL;I
L;NT : (18)
The uninformed colluding rm does not know if demand is high or low.
When colluding it merely agrees to produce qU . The expected per period payo¤
to the uninformed rm is then
COLL;UNT = q
U aH
2
+ (1  )qU
aL
2
: (19)
Note here that rms do not communicate as part of the collusive equilibrium.
Thus in any given period there is only a 1=n chance that a rm knows demand,
even if rms collude. Thus, in any future period the expected collusive prots
are
COLLNT =
1
n
COLL;INT +
n  1
n
COLL;UNT : (20)
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4.2 Cheating Payo¤s
When cheating, the informed rm maximizes current prots given that the
uninformed rms continue to produce qUj . When demand is high the informed
rm produces
aH (n 1)q
U
j
2 . The market price then is also equal to this quantity.
Thus the cheating payo¤ to the informed rm is
CH;IH;NT =

aH   (n  1)q
U
2
2
: (21)
Similarly, if demand is low then the cheating payo¤ to the informed rm will
be
CH;IL;NT =

aL   (n  1)q
U
2
2
: (22)
An uninformed rm may cheat as well. However, since this uninformed rm
does not know the state of demand, it maximizes expected prots given that
demand may be high or low. Moreover, its optimizing decision is made given
that the other uninformed rms continue to produce qU ; and the one informed
rm continues to produce its collusive output. Thus a cheating uninformed rm
turns out to produce (ah al)+al+2q
U
4 . Its expected market price is also equal
to this quantity. Thus the cheating payo¤ to the uninformed rm is
CH;UNT =

(ah   al) + al + 2q
U
4
2
: (23)
4.3 Punishment Payo¤s
In the punishment phase both types of rm revert to the asymmetric information
Cournot equilibrium. Thus the payo¤s in the punishment phase are the same
as the payo¤s presented in Section 2.2.
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4.4 The Trigger Strategy That Ensures Cooperation
We continue to consider an equilibrium where, if a rm cheats in one period,
then, all rms produce the non-cooperative outputs forever afterwards. In this
section we calculate the rate of return from collusion for an informed rm that
knows that current demand is high. The calculations for the other cases are
very similar.
Proposition 3 below then yields a formula for rNT , the maximum interest
rate consistent with a credible trigger strategy that maintains full collusion in
the absence of communication.
An informed rms expected discounted payo¤ from colluding, given that it
knows that current demand is high, is
COLL;IH;NT +
1
r
COLLNT (24)
where COLL;IH;NT ,and 
COLL
NT are dened in equations (16) and (20) respectively.
The expected present and future payo¤s to a cheating informed rm is
CH;IH;NT +
1
r
NC ; (25)
where CH;IH;NT and 
NC are dened in equations (21) and (7) respectively. The
informed rm will then cooperate only if
r  rIH(q
U ) =
COLLNT   
NC
CH;IH;NT   
COLL;I
H;NT
: (26)
Notice that rIH is a function of q
U . Similarly we can derive rIL(q
U ) and
rU (qU ) as functions of qU as well. In Appendix A.3.1 we prove that rIH(q
U ) and
rIL(q
U ) are identical. Thus, calling their common value rI(qU ) we have
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rIH(q
U ) = rIL(q
U ) = rI(qU ): (27)
That is, the incentive to cheat is independent of whether current demand is high
or low. We use these derivations to prove Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Given asymmetric information about current demand, when
rms do not communicate, the maximum interest rate consistent with a credible
trigger strategy is rNT = r

0 =
4n
(n+1)2 :
Proof. In Appendix A.3.1 we rst prove that rIH(q
U ) = rIL(q
U ) for all qU : Thus,
we represent both functions by rI(qU ), so rIH(q
U ) = rIL(q
U ) = rI(qU ):7 Now,
the informed rm will cheat for any interest rate higher than rI(qU ). Similarly,
the uninformed rms will cheat for any interest rate higher than rU (qU ). This
means that if the market interest rate is above rU (qU ) but below rI(qU ) then
the uniformed rm will cheat and the collusion will fail. Similarly if the market
interest rate is above rI(qU ) but below rU (qU ) then the informed rm will
cheat and collusion will fail. Thus, the function r(qU ) = min(rI(qU ); rU (qU ))
gives the maximum interest rates for which both uninformed and informed rms
will collude, as a function of r(qU ). In other words, rms in the cartel are
willing to collude if and only if the market interest rate lies below r(qU ): Now,
Appendix A.3.1 also proves that rI(qU ) decreases as qU increases, and Appendix
A.3.2 shows that rU (qU ) increases as qU increases.Thus, the maximum market
interest rate at which full collusion is stable, rNT , must be where r
I(qU ) =
rU (qU ): In Appendix A.3.3 we show that rI(qU ) = rU (qU ) = r0 for q
U =
(aH aL) aL
2n : Thus, the maximum value of rNT for which all rms in the cartel
7The di¤erence between current cheating prots for the informed rm and its current
collusive prots is the same in the high and low demand cases. Thus, the informed rms
incentive to cheat stays the same when current demand is high or low. This precise result
seems to be an artefact of our assumptions of constant marginal costs and linear demand
curves.
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will collude is determined by setting qU = (aH aL) aL2n in r
I(qU ) and rU (qU ):
This substitution gives us rNT = r

0 =
4n
(n+1)2 :
8 QED.
Intuitively, part of the reason cartels with asymmetric information and com-
munication are unstable is because the informed rm has an incentive to lie
about the state of demand to the other, uninformed rms. However, if rms
do not communicate they cannot lie, which increases cartel stability. Of course,
the informed rms incentive to cheat is also higher in the high demand state.
However, if rms do not communicate then the informed rm will, under the
collusive agreement, produce much more in the high demand state, while the
uninformed rms produce a constant quantity based on average demand. As
a consequence, the informed rm is able to counter its increased incentive to
cheat by producing more when demand is high. Thus, even when demand is
high, the informed rms increased incentive to cheat is exactly countered by
an increased reward from collusion. These two opposing e¤ects therefore lead
to a critical interest rate that is the same as when aH = aL, i.e., the same as
when there are no demand uctuations at all. Thus, demand uctuations have
no impact on cartel stability when rms do not communicate.
The main result here, that demand uctuations have no impact on cartel
stability when rms do not communicate, is of course in part a consequence of
the specic assumptions we have made, e.g., linear demand curves. However,
the general point  that collusion is very stable when rms do not communicate
 should be quite robust. Future research may determine how sensitive this
result is to di¤erent specications of demand, information structures, and other
aspects of the model.
8Proof for this statement is provided in appendix A.3.3.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we show that asymmetric information decreases cartel stability
when rms communicate, but may actually increase cartel stability when they
do not. This is a surprising result in an area that has hitherto not received much
attention. Whinston (2006 p. 26), for example, acknowledges that most econo-
mists have not cared to investigate how communication a¤ects cartel stability
because they believe (as I do) that direct communication...often will matter
for achieving cooperation. Our results, by contrast, suggest that cartels may,
in fact, often prefer not to communicate.
The results here, apart from shedding some light on a gap in the literature,
may also have signicant policy implications. For example, antitrust enforce-
ment would have to take into account the possibility that collusion may not
depend on formal communication, even in stochastic environments with asym-
metric information, where one would expect that communication is needed to
achieve coordination. This in turn might a¤ect the types of legal investigations
which should be made by antitrust authorities. For example, the Justice De-
partment should expect collusive communication to occur primarily in markets
where communication actually is needed for coordination.
Our paper may also have implications for how empiricists look at data.
Thus empirical work that looks at the underlying factors that help or hinder
collusion should focus on the information structure of a suspected cartel in order
to determine whether collusion is likely to depend on communication between
cartel members.
Of course several caveats to our argument are in order. First, our model
is very simple. We assume very simple functional forms, and a very simple
information structure. It may be useful, for example, to compare our models
information structure to the information structure in Green and Porter (1984).
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Second, the punishment strategy we assume is also very simple. If one allowed
for optimal punishment strategies (see Abreu, 1986 and Abreu, et al., 1986),
then cartels would presumably be more stable. The issue of asymmetric punish-
ments (Segerstrom, 1985) also needs to be considered. Third, iid demand shocks
might drive some of our results. If current strong demand implies stronger de-
mand in the next period (Haltiwanger and Harrington, 1991) then the informed
rms willingness to lie and cheat may be o¤set by higher collusive prots to-
morrow.
Finally, it would be interesting to develop models where rms must com-
municate in order to coordinate e¢ciently. For example, if rms have upward
sloping marginal cost curves, then optimal collusion will require informed and
uninformed rms to all produce similar quantities. This would require commu-
nication, which would reduce the cartels stability. Similarly, if more than one
rm is informed then our paper suggests that cartels might be more unstable if
these informed rms need to communicate to determine who knows what. In-
vestigating di¤erent information structures such as this would be an important
avenue for future research.
References
[1] Abreu, D. 1988. On the Theory of Innitely Repeated Games with
Discounting. Econometrica 56:383-396.
[2] Abreu, D. 1986. Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames.
Journal of Economic Theory 39:191-225.
[3] Abreu, D., D. Pearce, and E. Stacchetti. 1986. Optimal Cartel Equi-
libria with Imperfect Monitoring. Journal of Economic Theory 39:251-69.
28
[4] Aoyagi, M., 2002. Collusion in Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly With
Correlated Private Signals and Communication. Journal of Economic The-
ory 102:229-248.
[5] Athey, S., and Bagwell, K., 2001. Optimal Collusion With Private
Information. RAND Journal of Economics 32:428-465.
[6] Athey, S., Bagwell, K., and Sanchirico C., 2004. Collusion and Price
Rigidity. Review of Economic Studies 71: 317-349.
[7] Bagwell, K., and R.W. Staiger. 1997. Collusion Over the Business
Cycle. RAND Journal of Economics 28:82-106.
[8] Borenstein, S., and A. Shepard. 1996. Dynamic Pricing in Retail
Gasoline Markets. RAND Journal of Economics 25: 429-451.
[9] Chevalier, J.A., and D.S. Scharfstein. 1996. Capital Market Imper-
fections and Countercyclical Markups: Theory and Evidence. American
Economic Review 86:703-725.
[10] Choi, D. and G.C. Philippatos. 1983. Financial Consequences of An-
titrust Enforcement. Review of Economics and Statistics 65:501-506.
[11] Compte, O. 1998. Communication in Repeated Games With Imper-
fect Private Monitoring. Econometrica 66:597-626.
[12] Conlon, J. 1996. Cooperation for Pennies: A Note on "-Equilibria.
Journal of Economic Theory 70:489-500.
[13] Conlon, J. 2002. Hope Springs Eternal: Learning and the Stability
of Cooperation in Short Horizon Repeated Games. Journal of Economic
Theory, forthcoming.
29
[14] Domowitz, I., R.G. Hubbard, and B.C. Petersen. 1986. Business Cy-
cles and the Relationship Between Concentration and Price-Cost Margins.
RAND Journal of Economics 17:1-17.
[15] Ellison, G. 1994. Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive
Committee. RAND Journal of Economics 25:37-57.
[16] Feinberg, R.M. 1980. Antitrust Enforcement and Subsequent Price
Behavior. Review of Economics and Statistics 62:609-612.
[17] Fraas, A.G., and D.F. Greer. 1977. Market Structure and Price Col-
lusion: An Empirical Analysis. The Journal of Industrial Economics 26:
21-45.
[18] Friedman, J. 1971. A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames.
Review of Economic Studies 38:1-12.
[19] Fudenberg, D., and E. Maskin. 1986. The Folk Theorem in Repeated
Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information. Econometrica
54:533-554.
[20] Green, E., and R. Porter. 1984. Noncooperative Collusion Under Im-
perfect Price Information. Econometrica 52:87-100.
[21] Hay, G.A., and D. Kelley. 1974. An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing
Conspiracies. Journal of Law and Economics 17:13-38.
[22] Hajivassiliou, V.A. 1989. Testing Game-Theoretic Models of Price-
Fixing Behaviour. Cowles Foundation Working Paper #935.
[23] Haltiwanger, J., and J.E. Harrington. 1991. The Impact of Cyclical
Demand Movements on Collusive Behavior. RAND Journal of Economics
22:89-106.
30
[24] Kandori, M., and H. Matsushima. 1998. Private Observation, Com-
munication and Collusion. Econometrica 66:627-652.
[25] Kreps, D., P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, and R. Wilson. 1982. Rational
Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners Dilemma. Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 27:245-252.
[26] Lambson, V.E. 1984. Self Enforcing Collusion in Large Dynamic Mar-
kets. Journal of Economic Theory 34(2) pp. 282-91.
[27] Pecorino, P. 1998. Is there a Free Rider Problem in Lobbying? En-
dogenous Tari¤s, Trigger Strategies, and the Number of Firms. American
Economic Review 88(3) pp. 652-60.
[28] Porter, R.H. 1983. A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive
Committee, 1880-1886. Bell Journal of Economics 14:301-314.
[29] Reksulak, M., W. F. Shughart II, R.D. Tollison, and A. Basuchoud-
hary. 2004. Titan Agonistes: The Wealth E¤ects of the Standard Oil (N.J.)
Case. Research in Law and Economics 21:6384.
[30] Rotemberg, J.J., and G. Saloner. 1986. A Supergame-Theoretic
Model of Business Cycles and Price Wars During Booms. American Eco-
nomic Review 76:390-407.
[31] Rotemberg, J.J., and M. Woodford. 1992. Oligopolistic Pricing and
the E¤ect of Aggregate Demand on Economic Activity. Journal of Political
Economy 100:1153-1207.
[32] Segerstrom, P.S. 1985. Symmetric and Asymmetric Punishments in
the Theory of Noncooperative Collusion. Econometrics and Economic
Theory Workshop Papers 8504.
31
[33] Suslow, V.Y. 1998. Cartel Contract Duration: Empirical Evidence
from International Cartels. Working Paper.
[34] Sproul, M.F. 1993. Anti-trust and Prices. Journal of Political Econ-
omy 101:741-754.
[35] Stigler, G.J. and J.K. Kindahl. 1970. The Behavior of Industrial Prices.
New York: Columbia University Press.
[36] Town, R.J. 1991. Price Wars and Demand Fluctuations: A Reex-
amination of the Joint Executive Committee. U.S. Department of Justice
Antitrust Division Discussion Paper EAG91-5.
[37] Vives, X. 1984. Duopoly Information Equilibrium: Cournot and
Bertrand. Journal of Economic Theory 34:71-94.
[38] Vives, X. 1990. Trade Association Disclosure Rules, Incentives to
Share Information, and Welfare. RAND Journal of Economics 21:409-430.
[39] Vives, X. 1999. Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools. MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA.
[40] Whinston, M.D. 2006. Lectures on Antitrust Economics. MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The rate of return from cooperation, rasym, is given in (13). The components
of rasym are 
COLL; CH;IH ; and 
NC : Below we rst calculate NC : Then we
nd COLL   NC and CH;IH   a
2
H=4n: Throughout let
32
A = aH + (1  )aL = (aH   aL) + aL:
9 (A1)
From equation (7), NC depends on NC;U and NC;I : To nd NC;U , substitute
(2), (3) and (4) into (5) to get
NC;U =
A
n+ 1

(n+ 1)aH   (n  1)A
2(n+ 1)

+
(1  )A
n+ 1

(n+ 1)aL   (n  1)A
2(n+ 1)

: (A2)
After considerable simplication this becomes
NC;U =
A2
(n+ 1)2
: (A3)
Next, to get NC;I , substitute equations (3) and (4) into equation (6), ob-
taining
NC;I = 

(n+ 1)aH   (n  1)A
2(n+ 1)
2
+ (1  )

(n+ 1)aL   (n  1)A
2(n+ 1)
2
: (A4)
After simplication this becomes
NC;I = 
a2H
4
+ (1  )
a2L
4
 
(n  1)(n+ 3)A2
4(n+ 1)2
: (A5)
Combining (A3) and (A5) in (7) we get
9Notice this is merely the intercept of the expected demand curve.
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NC = 
a2H
4n
+ (1  )
a2L
4n
 
(n  1)2A2
4n(n+ 1)2
: (A6)
Combining (1) and (A6) we get
COLL   NC =
(n  1)2A2
4n(n+ 1)2
: (A7)
This gives the numerator of equation (13).
Now we turn to the denominator of equation (13), where we subtract a2H=4n
from the cheating prots in (9). This gives
CH;IH  
a2H
4n
=

2naH   (n  1)aL
4n
2
 
a2H
4n
=
n  1
16n2
((2aH aL)
2n a2L): (A8)
Finally, substituting (A7) and (A8) into (13) gives
rasym =
Equation (A7)
Equation (A8)
=
4n(n  1)A2
(n+ 1)2((2aH   aL)2n  a2L)
: (A9)
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.
To prove proposition 2 we need to rst nd rsym and r

0 : To nd r

sym we need
to compare the expected payo¤ from cheating with the expected payo¤ from
colluding under symmetric information.
When information about demand is symmetric the cheating prot in the
high demand state is
CHsym =

(n+ 1)aH
4n
2
: (A10)
There is no di¤erence between monopoly prots for the symmetric information
and the asymmetric information cases. However, the (noncooperative) prot in
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the punishment phase when demand is high is
NCH;sym =

aH
n+ 1
2
: (A11)
When demand is low it is
NCL;sym =

aL
n+ 1
2
: (A12)
Thus, using (A11) and (A12), expected punishment prots for each rm when
information is symmetric is
NCsym = 

aH
n+ 1
2
+ (1  )

aL
n+ 1
2
: (A13)
Using these results, the return to collusion is
rasym =
COLL   NCsym
CHsym  
a2
H
4n
: (A14)
Substituting (1), (A10), and (A13) into (A14) yields
rsym =
4n
(n+ 1)2

+ (1  )
a2L
a2H

(A15)
Let " = aH aL
aL
: Then, plugging aH = (1 + ")aL into (A15) and taking the rst
order linear approximation of rsym around " = 0 gives
rLEsym =
4n
(n+ 1)2
 
8n(1  )
(n+ 1)2
": (A16)
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Similarly, plugging aH = (1 + ")aL into (14) and taking the rst order linear
approximation of rasym around " = 0 gives
rLEasym =
4n
(n+ 1)2
 
4n
(n+ 1)2
(
4n  2(n  1)
n  1
)": (A17)
Also when there is no demand uctuation, and therefore no scope for infor-
mational asymmetry in our model, the return to cooperation becomes (setting
aH = aL in (A15))
r0 =
4n
(n+ 1)2
: (A18)
Now the approximate proportion of the fall in the return to cooperation due
to asymmetric information is
rLEsym   r
LE
asym
r0   r
LE
asym
(A19)
Substituting (A16), (A17) and (A18) into (A19), gives n+12n (n 1) : This proves
Proposition 2.
A.3 Supporting Material for the Proof of Proposition 3.
We have derived rIH(q
U ) in equation (26). We can similarly derive rIL(q
U ) and
rU (qU ). In what follows we rst show that rIH(q
U ) and rIL(q
U ) are equal and
then show that their common value, rI(qU ), is decreasing in qU : Then we show
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that rU (qU ) is increasing in qU : This allows us to prove Proposition 3 in the
main text.
A.3.1 Proof that rIH(q
U ) and rIL(q
U ) are equal and decreasing in qU :
Equation (26) gives us rIH(q
U ): Replacing COLL;IH;NT and 
CH;I
H;NT in equation (26)
with COLL;IL;NT and 
CH;I
L;NT from equation (17) and (22) respectively gives us
rIL(q
U ): The informed rm will therefore honor the collusive agreement when
current demand is low i¤
r  rIL(q
U ) =
COLLNT   
NC
CH;IL;NT   
COLL;I
L;NT
: (A20)
Notice that equation (26) for rIH(q
U ) and (A20) for rIL(q
U ) di¤er only in
denominator. In what follows we rst calculate the denominators for (26) and
(A20) separately and show that they are equal. We then derive the common
numerator.
When demand is high current collusive prot to the informed rm is given
by equation (16) and cheating prot to the informed rm is given by equation
(21). Substituting these values into the denominator in (26) gives us
CH;IH;NT   
COLL;I
H;NT = (
aH   (n  1)q
U
2
)2   (
aH
2
  (n  1)qU )
aH
2
=
1
4
 
qU
2
(n  1)
2
: (A21)
Similarly, when demand is low then the current collusive prot to the in-
formed rm is given by equation (17) and cheating prot to the informed rm
is given by equation (22). Substituting these values into the denominator of
(A20) also gives us (A21). Thus, both the numerator and the denominator of
(26) are identical to those of (A20). In other words, rIL(q
U ) = rIH(q
U ): Thus,
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we represent both rIH(q
U ) and rIL(q
U ) by rI(qU ) and equations (26) and (A20)
can be replaced by
rI(qU ) =
COLLNT   
NC
1
4 (q
U )
2
(n  1)
2
: (A22)
We now derive the numerator of (A22). First we substitute equations (16)
through (19) into equation (20) to give us expected collusive prots in the future
in terms of ; aH ; aL; and n: On the other hand, 
NC is dened in (A6). Upon
simplication we get
COLLNT   
NC
=
1
4n
 
a2l + (a
2
H   a
2
L)

  
a2H
4n
  (1  )
a2L
4n
+
(n  1)A2
4n(n+ 1)2
=
(n  1)2A2
4n(n+ 1)2
(A23)
Thus, after substituting (A23) in (A22) we get
rI(qU ) =
=
(n 1)2A2
4n(n+1)2
1
4 (q
U )
2
(n  1)
2
=
A2
n (qU )
2
(n+ 1)
2
(A24)
Notice that qU only appears in the denominator of (A24):10 The numerator
of (A24) is positive and the denominator rises as qU rises. Therefore rI(qU )
10 IS THIS FOOTNOTE EVEN NECESSARY NOW?????????
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decreases as qU rises:
A.3.2 Proof that rU (qU ) is increasing in qU :
Equation (19) gives the current expected collusive prot to an uninformed rm
and equation (23) gives the expected cheating prot to an uninformed rm.
Further, recall that (A20) and (A6) give the expected future collusive prots
and the expected future punishment prots for all rms. Thus, substituting
these values into
rU (qU ) =
COLLNT   
NC
CH;UNT   
COLL;U
NT
(A25)
gives us rU (qU ):
Notice that once again the numerator of (A25) is the same as that for (A21)
and is independent of qU : The denominator however, upon subsituting (19) and
(23), simplies to
1
16
 
A   2q
U
2
(A26)
Now, upon taking the rst derivative of (A26) w.r.t. qU we nd
d
dqU

1
16
 
A   2q
U
2
=  
1
2

A
2
  qU

:
Recall that qU is the quantity produced by uninformed rms when they believe they are
colluding. Thus, NC is independent of qU since qU is not relevant in the punishment phase.
Expected collusive prots are also independent of qU . As qU rises the expected collusive
prots for the informed rm falls at a constant rate while the expected collusive prots for the
uninformed rm rises at a constant rate. In fact, the fall in expected collusive prots for the
uninformed rm is always (n 1) times the rise in expected collusive prots for the uninformed
rm. But any rm has an (n   1)=n chance of being uninformed and a 1=n chance of being
informed. Thus, as qU rises, the fall in expected future prots given the likelihood that a rm
is informed, is exactly matched by a rise in the expected future prots given the likelihood that
the rm is uninformed. Thus a rise in qU has no impact on future collusive prots. Similarly
a fall in qU will have no impact on future collusive prots either. This happens because under
collusion, the informed rm adjusts its output each period to maximize indutry prots for that
period given demand. This prot is independent of rms market shares because marginal cost
is constant in our model.
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Thus, the rst derivative of (A26) w.r.t. qU is negative for all values of qU <
A
2 : Also, q
U will never be 
A
2 . Industry prot maximizing cartels will never
choose qU 
A
2 because then the quantity produced by the informed rm would
exceed the industry prot maximizing amount when demand is low, since A >
aL. Thus for all relevant values of q
U the expression 116
 
A   2q
U
2
decreases
as qU increases. That is, the denominator (A25) falls as qU rises for all relevant
values of qU : Note, incidentally, that qU =
A
2n lies in this range. This particular
value, qU =
A
2n , is important because at this value of q
U , rU (qU ) = rI(qU ); as
proven in the next section of this appendix.
The numerator of (A25) is identical to the numerator for (A22) which, recall,
is independent of qU : Thus, the numerator of (A25) is also independent of qU :
Therefore, since its denominator is decreasing in qU , rU (qU ), is increasing in
qU .
A.3.3 Proof that rI(qU ) = rU (qU ) = r0 when q
U =
A
2n :
We derived rI(qU ) in section A.3.1.11 We also derived rU (qU ) in section A.3.2.
We also noted, in section A.3.2 that the expressions for rI(qU ) and rU (qU ) as
shown in (A22) and (A25) respectively di¤ered only in the denominator and that
the numerator was independent of qU . Thus, setting the denominators of (A22)
and (A25) equal to each other will give us the values for which rI(qU ) = rU (qU ):
We therefore solve for qU by setting
1
4
 
qU
2
(n  1)
2
=
1
16
 
A   2q
U
2
: (A27)
After taking the square root on both sides of (A26) we get
11Recall, that in Section A.3.1. we showed that rI(qU ) = rIH(q
U ) = rIL(q
U ):
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12
qU (n  1) = 
1
4
 
A   2q
U

: (A28)
Now solving for qU gives us
qU =
A
2n
: (A29)
Thus, rI(qU ) = rU (qU ) when qU =
A
2n :
12 We substitute qU =
A
2n ; (A23), and
(A6) into (A22) and (A25) and simplify. This gives us
rI(qU ) = rU (qU ) =
4n
(n+ 1)
2 = r

0 : (A30)
12The negative root gives us qU < 0 which is meaningless. Therefore we do not use the
negative root.
I think the above is a more obvious and neater reasoning than recalling qU < A=2: then
showing that A   2q
U > 0 and so on.
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